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1. Introduction
Since the early 1 980's, imperfectly competitive market structures have been
incorporated into theories of international trade.1 These new theories were
motivated by empirical observations such as the large amount of intra-inciustry or
two-way trade in similar products between countries, and retied on the development
of tractable models of monopolistic competitior It is now common to incorporate
intra-industry trade, due to monopolistic competition, into the specification of
equations explaining trade flows. However, it can be argued that these estimating
equations depend to a rather limited extent on the market structure. For example,
Helpman (1987) notes that his specification of trade volume equations Consistent
with monopolistic competition also applies when countries are specialized in
different products for any other reason.2 In other words, these empirical methods
that incorporate intra-industry trade do not directly test the importance of market
structure.3
Market structure hasalso been a focus of current research in sociology
dealing with the network structure of modern economies (see the survey by
PowelL, 1990). A network refers to linkages among firms arising from
relationships based upon common ownership, shared production or distribution of a
commodity, or shared fiscal control, such as through a holding company or bank. For
example, a production network represents the firms linked together, from the early
to final stages of production, to produce a finished product; a distribution network
would trace the firms that take the product to the final consumers.
Particular attention has been paid to the differences among network
structures within the rapidly developing countries in East and Southeast Asia, as
well as the differences between these countries and other parts of the world.4 It
has been found that business networks in Japan and South Korea consist of
interlinkages among many sizes of firms, with the larger firms integrating and
coordinating the activities of the smaller firms in the production and distribution
of many major commodities. The largest firms, in turn, are connected through
common ownership. By contrast, production networks in Chinese areas, such as in
Taiwan and Hong Kong. typically consist of close linkages among similarly sized,
mostly small and middle-sized, independently owned firms. These production
networks rely, at an arm's length, on other firms and other networks to supply
inputs and to distribute products.
Although these sociological studies have been reasonably effective at
documenting the differences among networks across countries, they have not
demonstrated that these networks have any direct economic impact, such as on
international trade. In this paper we propose to combine the sociological data on
networks with economic hypotheses about the performance of firms, in order to
demonstrate that market structure indeed has a significant economic impact on
international trade.
We shall focus on one particular type of network - the common ownership of
firms within a business group - and contrast the influence of these groups on the
trade performance of South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. We will center our analysis
on Korea and Taiwan. countries which have very different market structures. Korea
has many large, vertically-integrated business groups known as chaebol. whereas
business groups in Taiwan are smaller and horizontally-integrated in the production
of intermediate inputs, but do not participate in the production or distribution of
final products. Because the two countries are at roughly similar stages of
development (measured by per-capita GNP), the sharp difference in the market
structures between these two economies are ideal for a comparative study (as also
conducted by Levy, 1991, and Rodrik, 1993). Since the keiretsu are so well-known.
we shall also include Japanese business networks in our analysis.5 Including Japan
allows us. moreover, to contrast the trade performance of a more developed economy
with that of developing economies.
2
In section 2. we describe the business groups in the three countries more
carefully. In section 3. we use this information to construct a stylized model of
business groups and trade performance. The essential features of the model are
that new intermediate inputs can be created to enhance the productivity of
downstream purchasers. The business groups in Korea are treated as vertically
integrated. i.e. they supply some of their own inputs, whereas the firms in Taiwan
purchase all inputs from non-affiliated firms. The model suggests that the
production of final goods in Korea is subject to increasing returns to scale within a
group, so that firms will choose to focus production on a narrow range of products.
but at a potentially high volume. In contrast, firms in the stylized Taiwan economy
will produce a greater range of product varieties.
In section 4 we consider how to empirically test the hypotheses from the
stylized model. The data used are U.S. imports or highly disaggregate products from
Korea, Taiwan and Japan. Using the techniques from Feenstra (1993), indexes of
product variety are constructed at the 5-digit industry level to reflect the range of
products sold from each country. In addition, product mix indexes are constructed
to reflect whether each country tends to export high-priced or low-priced products
within each 5-digit category. We show that both indexes can be theoretically
interpreted as a measure of consumption services provided by the imports.
Our results are presented in section 5. We find that Taiwan tends to export
a greater variety of products to the U.S. than Korea. and this holds across nearly all
industries. In addition, Taiwan has a higher product mix in industries producing
intermediate inputs, whereas Korea has a higher product mix in the final goods
industries. This results are discussed in relation to the theoretical hypotheses, and
in relation to the business group structure of the two economies. We argue that
the results confirm the importance of market structure as a determinant of trade
patterns. A comparison with the Japanese trade pattern is presented, and our
conclusions are summarized in section 6.
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2. Business Groups in East Asia
2.1 DescriptIons of the Groups
One of the most important features or Korea's industrial organization is the
business groups, or chaebol.6 These groups, consisting of legally-Independent firms.
are affiliated under a common group name and are centrally controlled through
direct family ownership and mutual shareholding among member firms. As shown in
Table I, the 50 largest business groups accounted for 45% of total sales in the
manufacturing sector in 1983. and even more in other sectors. These sales figures
give an inflated estimate of the importance of the chaebol, however, because
transactions of semi-finished goods between firms within a group are included. In
Table 1, the figures in parentheses give the value-added shares accounted for by the
business groups within each sector, and these figures are not affected by the
frequency of intra-group transactions.7 Overall, the value-added of the top 50
business groups accounted for one-fifth of GDP in 1983 (Zeile, 1991).
In the manufacturing, sector, the chaebol spread across many industries. As
shown in Table 2, there were five manufacturing industries in which the chaebol
accounted for more than 50% of the total sales, and eight others in which they
accounted for between 25 and 50%. Many of these are chemical or heavy industries.
This pattern of concentration is a direct result of the government's credit policy.
During the 1970s, the Korean government applied discriminatory interest rates and
controlled both domestic and foreign loans in order to influence industrial
development, it supplied a large amount of credit With low interest rates to
business groups for investment in the heavy and chemical industries, with the result
that these industries and groups grew rapidly.
In general, the chaebol are strongly vertically-integrated. They internalize
many of the production processes (from raw materials to final products) and
distribution processes (domestic and foreign trade) within the business group.8
They form a self-sufficient system known in the Asian business literature as the
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one-set principled (Gerlach 1992. p. 85). Since the ownership and Policy-making
power are concentrated in the hands of only a few individuals for each group, their
member firms coordinate and cooperate quite well. Transactions with non-
affiliated firms are limited to those inputs that are not available internally.
In Taiwan, business groups are much less dominant in the final export sector.9
The total sales of the 96 largest Taiwanese business groups accounts for only 19%
of sales in the manufacturing sector (see Table 1). As shown in Table 2. they are
influential in a smaller number of manufacturing industries, principally those
producing intermediate goods.1° There is only one industry - textiles - in which the
group share of total sales is over 50%. and another three industries - chemical
materials, non-metallic mineral products, and food products - in which they have a
share between 25 and 50%.
The shares shown in parentheses in Table 2 include the sales of both business
groups and enterprises owned by the state government. The state-owned enterprises
are also concentrated in intermediate goods. Two out of the five industries with
significant government shares - basic metal and petroleum - are obvious upstream
industries. In the food industry, state-controlled enterprises mainly produce sugar.
salt, and animal feeds - all raw materials. In transportation industries, the state
is involved in shipbuilding and highway construction. Adding up the shares of
Taiwanese business groups and state-owned enterprises in the overall economy, their
dominance in intermediate goods industries is quite apparent, with the exception of
fabricated metal, a category that includes both intermediate and final goods.
The smaller size of Taiwanese business groups and their nearly exclusive
focus on intermediate inputs are two of the major distinctions between the
Taiwanese and Korean business groups. Although both economies are heavily export
oriented (Taiwan even more so than Korea). the largest business groups in each
economy occupy very different structural locations: The Korean chaebol dominate in
the export sector, and the biggest business groups in Taiwan produce intermediate
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goods that are sold domestically. These domestic sales are primarily to small and
medium size lrms that have only an Thrms length relationship with the producers
of intermediate inputs. Unlike the case in Korea, in Taiwan small and medium sized
firms produce and export on their own without direct assistance from the state or
from big businesses. Closer inspection of the holding of the large business groups
in Taiwan shows that they typically concentrate their investments in a single core
upstream business, and then diversify additional investments in unrelated areas.1 1
Based on self-reported information, over 40% of Taiwan's business groups reported
that none of their member firms were linked by ongoing business transactions. An
additional 33% reported five or fewer routine transaction linkages among member
firms.12
In Japan. the independent firms in intermarket business groups mutually own
each other shares. For any one firm, the controlling interest is held only by the
group as a whole (Orru. Hamilton. and Suzuki 1990; Gerlach 1992). Typically,
individual ownership, whether through stock or through private holdings, accounts
for very little of the total ownership of Japanese business groups. Most firms are
publicly listed on one of Japan's large stock exchanges, but only a small percentage
of the total shares are actually available for purchase. Most equity in business
group firms is held by other firms in the same business group.
Structurally speaking, there are two types of business groups in Japan: one a
horizontally and the second a vertically arranged network among firms (Orru,
Hamilton, and Suzuki 1989; Gerlach 1992). The first type, known as intermarket
groups, or intermarket keiretsV have ownership and loan relationships that extend
across unrelated industries. The major firms in these groups. along with a set of
relatively autonomous, very large firms (e.g. Toyota), organize a second type of
ownership network, called keiretsu or vertical keiretsu. These networks
illustrate the one set principle. They consist of interlinkages among many small.
medium, and large independent firms so that inter-firm networks overlaps directly
with production sequences. The activities of these production networks are
coordinated by the large firms in the network. The data in Tables 1 and 2 includes
the sales of the six major intermarket groups along with ten other vertical
keiretsu.1 In comparison with Korea, the Japanese business groups are more
specialized across industries, and account for substantial shares of sales rn
intermediate industries, chemicals, machinery, electronics and transportation
equipment.
2.2 ExplanatIons for the Groups
From this brief description, it is apparent that the business groups across the
East sian countries differ quite substantially. What causes the differences in
market structures among the countries? One can distinguish two principal
categories of explanation: transaction costs, drawing especially on the difference
in entrepreneurial talent and ties within the countries; and government support
provided to the industries through various policy instruments.
The transactions cost approach seeks to explain the market structure in terms
of the efficiency of making transactions in the market versus the firm. The work
of Williamson (1975, 1985) and others has formalized the nature of these costs -
including ex-ante and ex-post negotiation costs - and how they might differ across
industries. It has also been recognized that transactions costs can differ
substantially across countries, a point that Williamson (1985. p. 9) attributes to
Arrow: Arrow insisted that the problem of economic organization be located in a
larger context in which the integrity of trading parties is expressly considered
(1974). The efficacy of alternative modes of contracting will thus vary among
cultures because of differences in trust (Arrow, 1969. p. 62). Levy (1991)
provides some evidence at this point for the Korea-Taiwan comparison.
Er-ante contracting costs, such as the costs of collecting information and
negotiating. should depend on the education level and the number of people involved
in commercial activities. In education. the percentage of people in Taiwan having
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more than twelve or more years of education was almost triple that in Korea in
both 1960 and 1970. The absolute number of this educated group was also higher ir'i
Taiwan than in Korea. even though the Korean population was more than double that
of Taiwan. Furthermore. Taiwan has had a greater percentage of the total
population engaged in commercial activity since before the turn of the century.14 In
addition, those engaged in independently run businesses in Taiwan constitute a higher
percentage of the total number of people engaged in business. By contrast, in Korea.
the percentage of employees in the total labor force, as opposed independent
entrepreneurs, is much higher. From a transaction cost perspective, the higher
density of those making independent commercial decisions in Taiwan facilitates the
rapid dissemination of information and encourages entrepreneurship in general.
In the stage of ex-post contracting, the transaction costs arise from the
exercise of opportunistic behavior. To compare these costs across countries, we
adopt Granovetter's (1985) emphasis of the role of social relations in generating
trust and discouraging malfeasance (p. 490). In a society with dense interpersonal
networks and frequent personal interaction, having a reputation for honesty and
reliability becomes an important business asset. In field interviews with
Taiwanese firms, many researchers (Kao, 1991; Numazaki .1991; Shieh, 1 992;
Hamilton, 1993) have found interpersonal trust to be the characteristic most
emphasized in developing business relations. The Chinese words xin (trust-
worthiness), guanxi (reciprocal personal relationships), and renching (human
emotions) denotes the set of personal traits that informants say are evoked to
create and assess reliable business associates.15 The guanxi relationships are
personal networks among peers, especially drawn from extended family, friends,
classmates, and those from the same towns, which form the basis of many business
relations. The networks generated through personal relationships are always more
important for conducting business than are legal contracts (Kao, 1991; Numazaki,
1991). In contrast, in Korea the social relations are more hierarchical in nature
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(Biggart. 1 ggO), with family, friends or persons from the same region being hired
as subordinates within a business group. An implication of this is that in Korea (or
Japan) it would be unacceptable for an individual to leave one firm and start a
competing firm, whereas this is commonplace in Taiwan, where workers will leave
an enterprise to develop related products.
Thus, the differences in the type of social relation networks found in Taiwan
and Korea appear to mirror the differences in the business group structures. We
would be reluctant to conclude that one factor causes the other, however, and both
features may reflect other underlying differences in the countries. For example.
institutional differences between the countries, such as those governing kinship.
inheritance, and property rights, establish parameters to social relationships that
in turn shape the business strategies people use)6 Among the Chinese, for
instance, the presence of a patrilineal kinship system with partible inheritance
(i.e., all Sons divide the father's estates equally) means that it is difficult for a
family's holding to remainunder central control for more than a few generations
(Wong Siu-Lun. 1985). In contrast, the inheritance pattern in Korea gives a
dominant share to the eldest son, who often retains control over the entire family
holdings.
The transaction cost interpretation is directly related, and is complementary,
to the political economy explanation for the differences in market structure among
East Isian countries: market structure results from state intervention. The very
active government support given the chaebol in the 1970s, through credit policies
and other forms of industrial promotion, helps considerably to explain the market
structure of the Korean economy (Amsden, 1989: Koo. 1984). State support for
business groups has been demonstrated for many other countries, including Japan
(Hadley, 1970; Johnson. 1982) and also Taiwan (Pang, 1992; Numazaki. 1986; Gold.
1987). This link between political and business powers is unquestionably an
important factor in the development of the business groups.
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3. Model of Business Groups
To develop the implications of the business groups for economic performance,
we return to a feature of the Korean chaebol: whenever possible, inputs are
obtained from firms within the group. Profit maximization for the group as a
whole implies that these inputs will be supplied at marginal cost to other firms
within the group. Therefore, the vertical-integration leads to an efficiency gain
within the group, resulting in internal economies of scale: as output increases,
more inputs can be produced within the group and sold at marginal cost, leading to
reductions in the cost of producing final goods. Intuitively, we could expect these
internal economies of scale to results in longer production runs over a more narrow
range of output varieties. For this reason, we might expect an economy such as
Korea. with the vertically-integrated groups, to produce less Output varieties than a
non-integrated economy, such as Taiwan. In the section. we will theoretically
confirm this hypothesis in a model of monopolistic competition.
We will suppose that both final goods and intermediates inputs are produced
in many varieties. While the final goods are traded, we will treat the
intermediate inputs as r?ontraded internationally, as with producer services, for
example. Helpman and Krugman (1985. pp. 220-222) have used such nontraded
intermediate inputs to introduce the idea of industrial complexes, in which the
production of inputs and the final goods using them must occur in the same country,
and we will encompass these activities within a business group. For simplicity, we
do not allow for other intermediate inputs that are traded across borders.
Labor is the only primary factor, and is chosen as the numeraire, with one
unit of labor producing one unit of an intermediate input. Production of any variety
of the final good uses both labor and a CES aggregate of the intermediate inputs.
Then the cost of producing one unit of output can be written as +1cC')), where c()
denotes the CES unit-cost function:
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1-0 11(1-0)
c(•) fp(z) dz . (1)
and p(z) is the price of an intermediate input of type Z; 0>1 is the elasticity of
substitution; and (O,MJ is the range or intermediate inputs available to a firm (as
will be specified more fully below). We also adopt a CES utility function to obtatn
demand for the differentiated outputs. with the elasticity of substitution q>1.
It is useful to first solve for the equilibrium product diversity in the
absence of any vertical-Integration: we use the subscript a for this case. We
make the standard assumption that each firm produces only a single variety of th
output or input, and is therefore infinitesimally small compared to the total range
of varieties. It follows that the elasticity of demand for the input varieties is 0,
and for the output varieties is ii. Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost.
the price of the intermediate inputs is pa=0/(0-l). Substituting this into (1) we
obtain the unit-costs ca('), and then the price of the output is q8 =
Thus, the profits earned by each of these firms are:
Ttxa (pal)Xakx = (xa/0)-kx, (2a)
(qa — +(ca()1}ya - ku {+(Ca()]/(TI -1 ))ya — k (2b)
where Xa and Ya are the equilibrium quantities sold by the input and output-
producing firms, and kx and k are their respective fixed costs. Under free entry,
the profits in (2) will be zero, and we will denote the equilibrium range of input
and output varieties by Ma and Na. respectively.
In order to determine the range of product varieties, we could use the full-
employment condition in the economy. As a short-cut, however, we can instead
appeal to the equality of GNP measured as the payment to factors or the value of
final output (where we assume the trade is balanced in the final goods sector).
This equality is stated as:
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Making use of (3) and (2b) with Tty:O. we immediately solve for the equilibrium
range of output varieties:
Na LJk (4)
Our next task is to determine how vertical-integration will influence the number of
output varieties.
A business group (denoted with the subscript b') will maximize profits over
the ranges of outputs and inputs produced, which implies marginal-cost pricing of
the inputs sold internally. This pricing scheme will have an impact on the unit-
costs +(c(.)J only if the group produces a positive range (measure) of inputs Mb>O.
as we shall assume is the case. These inputs may or may not be sold to other
firms, as we shall discuss below. We will argue below that each group will find it
optimal to produce a positive range of Outputs Nb>O. because the economies of scale
from producing inputs inte,nally also creates economies of scope. The number of
business groups is denoted by G. which will be determined by a zero-profit condition
for the groups. We will also allow for the production of inputs and outputs by non-
integrated firms.
The profits of a business group producing Mb inputs and Nb outputs are:
Ttb NIq - +(cb(.)1}yb - Nbky • Abxb(pb — 1) - Mbkx. (6)
where b1Mb denotes the range of inputs that the group sells to outside firms, at
the price Pb and quantity Xb. The reason that the group might sell less than the full
range of inputs is that each input leads to a reduction in costs cb(') for another
business group, which will be competing with the selling group in the output
market.
To see how the sale of inputs will affect costs, notice that the CES unit-
costs for a group can be written as:
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where Ma denote the range of inputs sold by non-integrated firms at the price
01(0-i): Mb is the range of inputs produced by the business group and supplied to
itself at marginal cost; and (G-1)b are the inputs supplied from all other groups
at the price Pb. An increase in the range of inputs Ab supplied from one business
group to another will lower unit-costs in (1'). and therefore increase the
competition in the output market. It is quite possible that groups will choose to
not sell any inputs to each other, or sell only a portion of the inputs that they
produce, depending on whether the profits from selling exceed the losses induced by
the competition in differentiated outputs. While we have worked through some
examples to determine that these various outcomes are possible, our principal
results will not depend on whether business groups sell to each other or not.
Profits of the non-integrated firms producing inputs and outputs can be
written as in (2). where we continue to use the subscript a to denote non-
integrated firms. The variables Ma. xa. Na. and Ya are still interpreted as the
varieties and outputs produced by the non-integrated firms, though of course, their
values will change when there are also business groups in the economy. We must
have ltxa 10 and ltUalO in equilibrium, and several additional results can be obtained
on the sign pattern of profits.
Consider a business group that sells its full range of inputs Mb to other
groups or non-integrated firms. Since this decision may not be optimal, we denote
its profits by ib11tb, where tt,.:O from free entry of business groups. The group
selling all of its inputs must have higher profits than a combination of Mb non-
integrated firms selling inputs, and Nb non-integrated firms selling outputs. so that
Ttb > NbTtya • MbTtxa. This result follows from the efficiency gain within a group
from pricing inputs sold internally at marginal cost, which results in a rise in
profits over the non-integrated firms. However, since b10, it follows that at
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least one of Txa or Tt must be strictly negative: in addition to the business
groups in the economy. there can be non-integrated firms producing either inputs or
outputs, but not both.
A second result is obtained by comparing MbTtxaIO with the expression
(Rbxb(pb - 1) • Mbkx]. which is a component of grp profits n (6). The term
(Xb(pb 1)kx) is the profits of the business group from selling one input variety to
all outside firms, not including sales to itselr (where profits are zero). Because
the internal sales are not included in the quantity xb. it can be argued that these
profits must be strictly less than ltxa. earned by a non-integrated firm from sales
to all groups and other output-producing firms.1 7 Then using b1Mb. it follows
that Ebxb(pb - 1) Mbkx] <MbTtx.O, so the component of group profits in (6) that
reflect the profits earned from selling inputs must be strictly negative. With
Ttb 0 from free entry, it follows immediately that the profits earned from sale of
outputs, or EN{q — 4cb.)])yb - Nbk), must be strictly positive.
This latter result s a critical feature of the equilibrium. The positive
profits earned from sale of outputs reflect an internal economies of scale from
production of intermediate inputs, thereby lowering costs, but leads to economies of
scope in producing a greater variety of outputs. That is. each additional output
variety that is produced will generate positive profits for the group. ceteris
paribus. As groups become large, however, the expansion of output varieties will
draw demand away from those varieties already produced, and this will serve to
determine the optimal size of a group.
To develop this idea formally, we can write the CES demand, from both
domestic and foreign consumers, for a single output variety j as:
* -rt
(L'w L )q.
Yj [GNbq.Naq.Ncq']
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where WL in the numerator is foreign income, and NN in the denominator are the
range of foreign varieties, sold at price q. Due to trade balance, the foreign wage
(relative to the domestic wage) is endogenous. and it' we solve for its equilibrium
value, the demand expression is simplified as:1 8
Lq
r i-1[GNbq •Naq j
If business groups treat the foreign wage as exogenous in their optimization, then
we use the demand equation (7). and let sbNNbqbyb/(L+w0L) denote the share of
world expenditure on the products of one group. Conversely, if groups treat the
foreign wage as endogenous. then we use (7') and let sby.Nbqbyb/L denote the share
of domestic output accounted for by the products of one group. Our analysis below
will apply under either assumption.
Differentiating profits Ttb with respect to Nb. using (7) or (7') and holding
qb, M, and Ab fixed at their optimal values, we obtain the following expression for
the optimal size (measured by the expenditure share) of each business group:
{qi - +b(')1Yb Nbky
Syb {qb-+Ecb(.)]}yb
> 0. (8)
From our discussion above, this expression is strictly positive, implying that a
group will produce a positive measure of outputs. The higher are the profits earned
from the sale of each output variety in equilibrium, the greater will be the share
of expenditure on the outputs of each group, and the smaller will be the equilibrium
number of groups.
We can now solve for the extent of product variety in the economy that
include business groups. It is again convenient to use the condition that total
income will equal total domestic product:
L GNqbyb • Nqya . (9)
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where GNb are the total output varieties produced by business groups, and Na are the
varieties produced by non-integrated firms, if they occur. The latter will price at
qa : +afl1(Tl). and from ltya :0 it follows that aYa : r1k. In contrast, the
business groups will charge prices higher than +bnt,'(l_1), since they produce
multiple output varieties. The optimal price for the groups is q +bb/(yb- 1 ),
where t.T4Syb(1_.q) is the elasticity of demand for the entire range of outputs
produced. Substituting these prices into (5). we obtain +byb = ky(eyb-1 )/(1 Syb) =
(i-l)k. Then using the positive profits from the sale of outputs by the group, we
find that bYb +bYb . : rtky. Using this in (10). it follows immediately that,
GNb • Na < L/r1k. (10)
Thus, by comparing this result with (4), we see that the economy with
vertically-integrated business groups will produce a smaller variety of outputs than
the non-integrated economy. The explanation for this result is that the efficiency
resulting from integration is reflected in positive profits on the sale of outputs
(With zero profits overall). These positive profits can be obtained only if the
business groups produce higher output quantity, or longer production runs, than would
a non-integrated firm with the same costs. From the resource constraint for the
economy, these higher output quantities mean that fewer product varieties are
produced in equilibrium.
This hypothesis will be tested empirically in the remainder of the paper. In
addition, we will consider the product mix of each country over high-priced and
low-priced import varieties, which is often used as a proxy for product quality.
Rodrik (1993) argues that reputational considerations for the large Korean chaebol
should lead them to produce at higher qualities than the smaller Taiwanese firms.
This hypothesis is consistent with our model, where the business groups produce
multiple output varieties, and should therefore be more concerned about their
reputation, and we also test for differences in product mix.
4. Empirical Model
4.1 Product Variety and Mix Indexes
In this section. we develop indexes of product variety and product mix for
U.S. imports from South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. For each industry, treat the U.S.
imports from each of these countries as differentiated across i1 N varieties,
where each country j1 J may supply only a subset l.{l N} of these varieties.
Let yj:(g1j.y2j UNJ) denote the vector of import quantities from country j. where
a zero element denotes no import of that variety. Finally, let the total services
obtained from imports of country j for the industry in question be obtained as the
CES function g(yj.Ij):
(-1)/ I'I/(ll-l)g(y.l) a1 y,1 , a1 >0, (11)
icli )
where the elasticity of substitution is Ti >1. If the product in question is a
consumer good, then g() represents the utility function for the varieties from
country j. and otherwise it is a production function of importing firms. We assume
that total utility or output from imports are obtained from the function:
U:F[g(y1 ,li ) g(yj.lj)J. (12)
which aggregates the services obtained from each country. Equation (12) assumes
that the import varieties from each country are weakly separable from each other
in F. which is convenient in developing our indexes.
Let Yj:>1.yij denote the total quantity of country js imports, measured in
physical units. Then the services obtained per unit of import is obtained by dividing
total services by the physical quantity Yj:
• g(y,l)/Y . (13)
The term A3 may be interpreted as the quality of country js overall imports. i.e.
total services obtained per ton of steel imports. Then (12) can be rewritten as:
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U:F(A1Y1 (1 2)
WhIle the quality variable cannot be measured directly. since it depends on
the unknown level of service g(y.lj). an empirical measure can be obtained by
considering the ratio of relative qualities A1/Ak. Letting qj > 0 denote the price
vector from country j. this ratio can be measured by:1 9
- i'2i (c(qj.Ij)
— /1 . (14)
Ak Ek/Yk c(qk.lk))
where E1 denotes total expenditure on imports from country j. and c(q1,l) is the
unit-cost function dual to (11):
( 1-1\1/(1-T1)c(q,l) b1 q1 . b1 = a1 . (15)
tiel1 )
Expression (14) is the ratio of unit-values of imports from country j and k,
divided by the ratio of unit-costs from the two countries. While the unit-values
are directy obtained from import data, the unit-costs are not observed. However,
their ratio can be measured by an exact price index. In particular, suppose that
and y are the cost-minimizing quantities with prices qj and q, respectively, and
that the set of common goods l.(ItCi It-i) imported from both countries is not
empty. Then from Feenstra (1993), the raflo of unit-costs can be measured as:
c(qj.lj)/c(qk.lk) P(qj.qk.yj,yk.l) (Xj/Xk) 1 /(i-1) (1 6)
where:
(a) P(q1 .qk .Yj .yk.I) is the price index of Sato (1976) and Vartia (1976). constructed
over the common goods 1:20
(b) X , qijyij /, qijy with the same formula applying for Xk.
itI iI
18
The result in (16) states that the ratio of unit cost of service equals the
price index of the common goods times the additional term (Xj/Xk)1'(h1. To
interpret this term, note that X is the proportion of the expenditure on the
common goods iti relative to the entire set of goods iel. Alternatively, X
measures one minus the expenditure share of the goods outside the set I. if country
has a larger share of revenue from selling the products other than the common
goods, so that X> X. it tends to lower the unit-cost ratio by an amount depending
on the power 1/(q-1). The higher is the substitution elasticity ii. the lower s the
impact of varieties supplied by only one country on its unit-costs.
We rewrite the quality ratio in (14) using (16):
A - 1ii !±11 (!11)
Ak - [P(q1,qk,y1,yk,I) j X)
(Product Mix) x (Product Variety)1_l). (14')
Thus, the overall quality ratio of the two countries is decomposed into two sources.
The first term on the right of (14') is the ratio of the unit-values to the price
index, or product mix. A higher value for this term indicates that country j sells
relatively more of the higher-priced varieties than does country k. The second term
represents the relative effect or product variety. Note that the expenditure share
ratio Xk/Xj in (14') has inverse subscripts to the quality ratio Aj/Ak. Therefore.
the greater (smaller) is the expenditure share on varieties from country j (k) that
are outside the set of common goods 1. the higher will be the variety index.
The product mix index has sometimes been used as a proxy for product quality,
though (14') shows that both the product mix and variety are components of AJ/Ak,
the quality of country j imports relative to those of country k. Our derivation
shows that both these indexes are well-motivated in terms of the preferences of
importing consumers or firms.
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4.2 Data and Hypothesis Tests
To contrast the product structures of south Korea, Taiwan and Japan in
product variety and mix, we will use disaggregate U.S. import statistics for i 978-
88. Since the U.S. is the largest destination market for both countries (more than
30% of Korean exports and 40% of Taiwanese exports came into the U.S. in the last
decade) their performances in this market should reflect the features of their
production quite welt. We shalt take each 7-digit TSUSA (Tariff Schedule of the
United States) number as a variety, and then construct the product mix and variety
indexes within each 5-digit SIC classification.21 In other words, the 5-digit SIC
level is taken as the industry for which product variety and mix are measured.22
The total sample of 1978-68 was broken into the two periods 1978-82 and
1983-88, to check for changes in product variety and mix that may have occurred.
The 5-digit industries used are those more than three varieties exported by both
countries in the full first or second period. For each of these industries, the
product variety and mix indexes are calculated in each year. To determine which
country dominates in product variety or mix, we compute the mean of each index
(measured in togs) over the years within each period, and test whether the log index
is greater or less than zero at the 10% level, using a one-sided t-test. More
formally, letting Znt denote the log of the product variety or mix index in year t.
and p denote its mean value, we assume that:
Znt Pn • tnt. where nt is distributed N(0,), (17)
and t lies in the ranges 1978-82 or 1983-88. Then we test the hypotheses:
H0: p.O versus H1: ji>O
and also, H6: jln>O versus Hj: jin<O . (18)
H0 or Ha are rejected if /S>t0g(t-1) or in/S < -tg(r-1), respectively, where T1
is the sample mean. S is its standard deviation and is the number of years in each
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period. We have descnbed this familiar test in detail because we shall generalize
it below.
For example. measuring the indexes as Taiwan (1) relative to Korea (K) as n
Table 3. if the null hypothesis that Mn: ln(XnK/XnT)IO is rejected, indicating that
Taiwan has greater expenditure on varieties not in the set of common goods, then
we conclude that Taiwan has greater product variety (denoted T>K); ii on the
contrary. the null hypothesis that pn: ln(Xn/Xni)O is rejected, then we conclude
that Korea has greater product variety (denoted K>T); and if neither of these
hypotheses are rejected, then the conclusion is uncertain (denoted U). The same is
done for the product mix index. In Table 3, we have summarized the results of
these hypothesis tests by 2-digit categories, each of which contain multiple 5-digit
industries. Entries in the columns marked T>K (K>T) show the number of 5-digit
industries for which the hypothesis j'nIO (pO) was rejected, while entries in
the columns marked U are the number of 5-digit industries for which neither
hypothesis was rejected.
In addition, we shall test the joint hypotheses that all 5-digit industries
within a 2-digit category have a log index that is positive, or negative. Letting n
index the 5-digit industries, and nN denote the 2-digit category. these joint
hypotheses are stated as:
H0: j1<O for all nN, versus H1: Mn>O for some rieN,
and also, H: Mn0 for all neN, versus Hj: Pn<O for some nN . (19)
For example. if there are three 5-digit industries within the 2-digit category, then
these are hypotheses on the vector y:(p1.j.12). The null hypothesis H0 specifies that
M must lie in the negative quadrant of R2, while the alternative Hi allows M to lie
anywhere else in R2. i.e. one mean could be positive and one negative, or both can be
positive.
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The test statistic for either hypothesis in (19) is constructed as a likelihood
ratio using the model in (1 7). In particular the likelihood ratio for H0 is
constructed as:
TT t(Znt')2 t/2L: . (20)
mm
ncN pn<ot(zntJmn)2
where t denotes the number of years in each sample, and 1n is the sample mean of
Zn. The expression in the numerator of (19) is simply the sum of squared residuals
(SSR) from (17). with 1n as the optimal choice for j.'n' while the expression in the
denominator is the SSR when the choice of .i is constrained to be non-positive.
The likelihood ratio L is less than unity, and will be smaller if is positive
and large for some n. so that forcing in the denominator substantially
increases the SSR. For large t, -2logL is asymptotically distributed as
where q is the number of industries within the 2-digit class N. Then a low value
for L will make it more lifcely that H0 is rejected, as should occur when is large
for some n. Like the hypotheses in (18). it is possible that neither of (19) are
rejected: but in contrast to (18), it is also possible that both the hypotheses in
(19) are rejected.
In Table 3A, we report the results of the testing hypotheses (19) when the
indexes are measured as Taiwan relative to Korea. If H0 (Hi) is rejected at the
1 0% level and H (H0) is not rejected at the 25% level then we conclude that Taiwan
(Korea) has higher product variety or mix, which is denoted by I (K). Borderline
cases occur when first hypothesis is not rejected at the 10% level, but is rejected
at the 25% level: or when the second hypothesis is not rejected at the 25% level,
but is rejected at the 10% level: and these are denoted by U followed by the letter
of the country that has the higher index at the weaker significance level. Cases
where the hypotheses in (19) are both rejected or both accepted are denoted by U,
indicating that the conclusion is uncertain.
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5. Empirical Results
5.1. TaIwan-Korea Comparison
A. Product Variety
The sharpest results tn Table 3 are obtained for the product variety index,
where Taiwan had greater variety in more industries within each 2-digit category
than Korea. In the 5-digit industries, it had higher product variety in 42-44% of
the industries in each period (bottom of Table 3), while Korea showed greater
diversity in only 5-8%. For the other half of the industries, the hypothesis test
was inconclusive.
In the 2-digit results in Table 3A. Taiwan was found to have greater product
variety in 10 industries for the first period and 12 industries for the second, while
Korea did not show greater diversity in any of the industries during both periods.
In addition, when we checked the absolute number of varieties exported, Taiwan
always provided more in every industry across the years, without exception. These
results strongly confirm that Taiwan, with non-vertically-integrated business
groups supplying inputs to'the export sector, provides greater product variety than
the Korean economy. An interpretation of these results is that the small export
firms in Taiwan fill many more market niches than the large, vertically-
integrated business groups in Korea.
B. Product Mix
From the product mix indexes reported in Table 3. we find that Korea
specializes in higher-value final (consumption and capital) goods, while Taiwan
specializes in higher-value intermediate goods. The evidence can be found in the
textile. wood, paper, and metal products industries. In textile mill products. Korea
and Taiwan had their own specialization's in different, but about the same number
of 5-digit industries, which made the 2-digit category uncertain; but Korea had a
clear lead in apparel, which uses the former as the intermediate input and creates
the final products. In the lumber and wood industry. Taiwan was ahead in lumber
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and wood products for both periods, while Korea was leading in furniture during the
second period. The third example is paper products. Korea and Taiwan had their
own strength in particular materials of paper. paperboard and paper boxes, but Korea
obviously excelled over Taiwan in the printing and publishing industry, which is the
last step to make paper products ready to be consumed. The last case is the metal
products sector. Taiwan had higher product mix in fabricated metal for both
periods and in primary metal during the first, while Korea led in industrial
machinery.
By dividing industries into intermediate and final products. the respective
specialization's of the two countries becomes more evident. In Table 3, for the
first period, there are 18 intermediate product industries in which Taiwan has
higher product mix, versus seven in Korea; but for final products. Korea had higher
product mix in 37 industries versus 1 7 for Taiwan. Korea moderately increases its
product mix for intermediate goods over time, and in the second period Taiwan has
higher product mix in 19 idustries versus 14 for Korea; while for final products.
Korea had higher product mix in 57 industries and Taiwan in 28. If we check this
finding with the results in Table 3A, all of the 2-digit categories in which Taiwan
had higher product mix are intermediate goods (with the exception of a weak result
in food products), for both the first and the second period. In contrast, Korea has
higher product mix in nearly one-half of the 2-digit final products. with the other
final goods categories being uncertain.
These results of the product mix index can be associated with the business
groups shares in Table 2. After adding up Taiwanese business group and state-owned
shares, there are six industries whose shares are greater than 30% of the total
sales - food (40.7%), textile mill products (50.7%). chemical materials (42.4%),
stone, clay & glass products (47.6%), primary metal (30.7%) and transportation
equipment (39.0%). Except for transportation equipment,23 in all other cases
Taiwan was either ahead or equivalent to Korea in product mix in the first period.
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even though Korea had similar or even greater business group shares. Taiwan's lead
in some cases was overtaken by Korea in the second period, particularly in food and
primary metal, where Korea had chaebol shares of 33.7% and 28.0%. respectively.
Both of these were higher than the Taiwanese business group shares, but lower than
the sum of the Taiwanese business group and state-owned shares.
Summarizing, the sectors in which Taiwan maintains a lead in product mix
are nearly all intermediate inputs, where it also has high business groups shares.
In contrast, Korea has higher product mix in many final products, where it also has
high cPiaebo! shares. Thus, the presence of business groups in either case appear to
be closely related to the production of high-value product varieties. One
explanation for these results could be that the multiple-output business groups, as
found in both economies, are more concerned with reputation and hence strive for
higher product quality (Rodrik. 1993).
5.2. ComparIson with Japan
Since Korea is less diversified and the comparison above is based on the
products that Korea and Taiwan both exported, the index results reflect Korea's
performance in exports better than Taiwan's. To present the overall performance of
Taiwan, we need a countrywith broader production range as the benchmark, and
Japan is used for that purpose.
A. Variety Index
Japan dominated both Taiwan and Korea in product variety. In the Taiwan-
Japan comparison, among 1 8 2-digit industries (Table 4A, bottom), Japan dominated
in 11 industries in the first period, but Taiwan caught up slightly and narrowed
down Japan's lead to 9 industries in the second period. Taiwan itself had greater
product variety in two cases, and the ranking was inconclusive in seven other
industries in this latter period. The industries in which Taiwan led - lumber and
wood products, leather products, and weakly in food products - were all light
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industries; four of the other 2-digit industries that could not be ranked with Japan
in variety were also light industries. Japan had greater variety than Taiwan across
nearly all of the heavy industries, however. In addition. Japan had greater product
variety than Korea in all 2-digit industries except leather products (Table 5A).
From our model of section 3. higher product variety is expected from an economy
that is much larger in its resource base, and this is confirmed by the comparison of
either Taiwan or Korea with Japan.
B. Product Mix Index
For the product mix index, reported in Tables 4-5. Taiwan and Korea each led
Japan within some 5-digit industries within most 2-digit categories, and Japan led
in other 5-digit industries. As a result, for the 2-digit hypothesis tests reported
in Tables 4A-5A, neither Taiwan nor Korea could be ranked with Japan in the vast
majority of cases.
Considering the results in Table 3A. during the first period Taiwan had higher
product mix than Japan in chemicals (weakly) and rubber and plastic industries,
but its leads in these two industries were overtaken by Japan in the second period.
In heavy industries. Taiwan had higher product mix only in fabricated metal (second
period), and weakly higher mix during only one period in chemical products and
transportation equipment (consisting or mainly bicycles and parts and auto parts).
For the Korea-Japan comparison in Table 5A, we find that Korea had higher
product mix in some of the light industries - food and leather products - as well as
heavy industries - industrial machinery in the first period, and transportation
equipment. For the latter, Korea had an advantage in selling more higher-value
bicycles and parts, while its auto parts could not be ranked with Japan; automobiles
are not included because Korea did not continuous export them in the full first and
second periods. Generally. Korea leads Japan in product mix only in selected final
goods industries, while Japan leads in a number of the intermediate products.
especially in the second period.
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6. Conclusions
We have applied the product variety and mix indexes, derived from the CES
aggregator function, to Korean and Taiwanese exports to the U.S. market. These
indexes were used to test the hypothesis that Taiwan contributed more product
varieties, due to its non-vertically-integrated market structure, and also observe
the differences in product mix. The results presented above strongly confirm the
high product variety of Taiwan relative to Korea. In product mtx, Korea led
especially in final (consumption and investment) goods. while Taiwan led in a
number of intermediate products.
By comparing these results with the business group shares among industries,
it appears that the large scale of the Taiwan business groups in intermediate
products served to facilitate the exporters of the same industries, making these
industries equivalent with Korea in product mix. On the other hand, the integration
of production in Korean chaebol make their final product exports relatively stronger
in product mix than their tntermediate product exports. We feel that these results
confirm the importance of market structure in determining trade patterns, and also
demonstrate the usefulness of using business groups as a measure of market
structure. Business groups of various types are found in many other Asian and
Western countries, and lead to large differences in market structure, as described
by Caves (1989). It can be hoped that these international comparisons may be used
to more fully determine the impact of market structure on international trade, and
on other aspects of economic performance.
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Footnotes
1 These theories are comprehensively analyzed in Helprnan and Krugman (1985).
2 For example, complete specialization may occur due to technological differences
across countries, as modeled by Davis (1991).
Indeed, Hummels and Levinsohn (1993) test a key hypothesis from Helpman's model
over a set of OECD countries, and over a set of non-OECD countries for which intra-
industry trade should not be important. They find substantial support for the
hypothesis in both sets of countries, suggesting that something other than
monopolistic competition explains the results.
See Granovetter (forthcoming) for a general review of the literature on business
groups. For research on business networks in Asia, see Gerlach (1992). Futatsugi
(1986), Hamilton and Biggart (1988). Orru, Hamilton. and Suzuki (1990), Orru,
Biggart and Hamilton (1991). and the papers in Hamilton (1991).
Fung (1991) and Lawrence (1991) have examined the effects of the keiretsu on
Japanese trade; see also the papers in Krugman (1991).
6 The chaebol are described in Amsden (1989), Biggart (1991) Hamilton and Biggart
(1988), Hamilton. Zeile, and Kim (1990). Kim (1991.1993,forthcorning). Orru,
Biggart. and Hamilton (1991). Steers et al. (1989) and Zeile (1991).
' Value-added figures were not available for the other countries in Table 1.
8 This internalization is explored in precise detail in our current research.
9 The literature on business groups in Taiwan is relatively small when compared
with the literature on the Korean chaebol. However, see Chou (1985), Greenhalgh
(1988). Hamilton and Biggart (1966), Hamilton and Kao (1991), and Numazaki
(1986.1991).
10 Some of the industries in Table 2 include both intermediate and final goods. such
as pulp & paper, printing & publishing (SIC 26*27) and lumber and wood products
(SIC 24*25). In these cases, we have classified the industry according to the
principal output in the country with the largest business group share.
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11 This is based on current research, which is found in Hamilton, Orru arid Biggart
(unpublished).
12 Hamilton. Zeile and Kim (1989, P. 122). This data is based upon the information
found in China Credit Information Service (1983).
' The six intermarket groups are Mitsubishi. Mitsui. Sumitomo. Fuyo, DKB. and
Sanwa. while the ten other keiretsu are Tokai Bank, IBJ, Nippon Steel, Hitachi,
Nissan, Toyota, Matsushita, Toshiba-IHI. Yokyu and Seiba.
14 See Levy (1991), Table 9, p. 166.
These notions of personal traits are described in greater detail in the chapters
on Chinese business networks in Hamilton (1991). Also see Hamilton and Kao (1991)
and Hamilton. Biggart,, and Orru (unpublished).
16 For examples of an institutional. social economy explanation for business roup
structures in East Asia, see Gereffi and Hamilton (1992). Hamilton and Biggart
(1988) and Whitley (1992).
1 The quantity Xa denotes the total sales of the intermediate input by a non-
integrated firm at the price p:O/(-1). and let Sxb denote the share of total sales
accounted for by one business group. If the business groups charged the same price
for intermediates as non-integrated firms, then we would have x, :xa(l-sxb), since
xb excludes sales of the input within the group. In fact, the business group will
charge a higher price for the inputs when they produce a positive measure of them.
so that Xb <x3(1 -Sxa). The optimal price for the group is Pb t/(-1), where
is the elasticity of demand for the entire range of inputs produced.
If follows that the profits earned on each unit sold are (pb_i):
(Pa1)/(15xb). Profits over all units are then (pb—l)xb- kx <(Pa_1)Xa_kx:Ttxa.
18 Trade balance in final goods implies LN"(q")1 th/[GNbqt +Naq *N(q*)1i]
,Nq1.N*(q_)1], where the left-side is home
import expenditure and the right-side is home exports. Using this equality in (7).
we immediately obtain (71.
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Expression (14) follows directly from (13). because total expenditure equals
unit-costs multiplied by output, or E:c(q1,lj)g(yj.I3).
20 From Sato (1976) and Vartia (1976), the formula for this price index is
P(qJ.qk.q.qk.I) . f(Ptj/p)' , where the weights w1(l) are computed using the
lel
expenditure shares of the two countries, as follows: s(l) . qjjyj1/qjjytj.
id
( 5;(I)-Sik(l) •\ ( s1(l)—s(I)
slk(l) qjkyj/qjyik. and w(l) Ins(l) - lnsik(l)J / lnsij(l) - lnsik(l)
tel tel
The numerator in the definition of w1(1) is a logarithmic mean of StJ and s. and
lies between these cost shares. Then the weights w1(l) are a normalized version of
the logarithmic means, and add up to unity.
21 The value and quantity of each 7-digit TSUSA commodity are reported in U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1978-88). which was obtained on magnetic tape. The price of
each variety is a unit-valu. computed by dividing total import value by total
quantity at the 7-digit TSUSA level. A concordance file matching TSUSA categories
with import-based SIC code numbers was used to construct the product groups.
22 An example of a 5-digit SIC category is men's and boy's suits, coats and
overcoats.' We also calculated all indexes using the 8-digit SIC as the industry
level, an example of which is 'men's and boy's suits.' The 5-digit and 8-digit SIC
levels gave very similar results for product mix and vareity; see Yang (1993).
23 The transportation industry is a special case in which Taiwanese business
groups' production is concentrated in automobile manufacturing and state-owned in
shipbuilding. most of which is for domestic consumption rather than export.
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Table 1 BusIness Group Shares by Major Sector, 1983 (Percent)
Sector
.
orea
Sales Share of
50 largest
chaebol
(valueadded)a
Taiwan
Sales Share
of 96 largest
business
groups
Japan
Sales Share
of 16 largest
keiretsub
Mining
Manufacturing
Construction
Transport & Storage
Banking & Finance
Trading & Commerce
10.6 (4.1)
45.4 (28.3)
66.0 (31.9)
23.1 (19.7)
n.a. (n.a)
n.a. (17.0)
0.0
19.0
5.6
1.8
5.8
4.1
17.6
33.2
14.
22.1
84.5
24.2
Source:
Hamilton (1988), Table 3; Hamilton, Zeile and Kim (1991), Table 4.
Notes:
a. Figures in parantheses give value-added of all firms in
business groups selling in that sector, relative to total value-
added of the sector, for the year 1986.
b. Figures for Japan are for fiscal year 1982.
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Table 2 Business Group Shares by Industry, 1983 (Percent)
Kor•a Taiwan Japan
Industry (SIC cod.) 50 largest 96 largest 16 largest
chaebol groups keiretsu
-___________
(& state)3
int.rm.diat. Product.
Textile Mill Products (22) 38.4 50.7 n.a.
Pulp & Paper;Printing & Publishing (26+27) 6.7 20lb 17.
Chemical Materials (28) 54.3 42.4 40.0
Petroleum & Coal Products (29) 91.9 0.0(95.9) 40.2
Stone. Clay & Glass Products (32) 44.6 47.6 29.0
Primary Metal (33) 28.0 7.8(30.7) 58.1
Fabricated Metal (34) 26.7 6.0 4.0
Final Products
Food Products (20) 33.7 26.3(40.7) l8.2
Beverage & Tobacco (21) 27.6 3.8 na.
Apparel & Textile Products (23) 12.6 12.0 0.0
Lumber & Wood Products; Furniture (24+25) 315e 4.0 0.0
Chemical Products (28) 24.0 8.4 n.a.
Rubber Products (30) 76.8 13.0 37.5
Plastic Products (30) 0.1 5.4 n.a.
Leather Products (31) 15.2 9.1 n.a.
Industrial Machinery (35) 34.9 3.6(9.8) 19.5
Electronic Products (36) 50.9 22.7 55.4
Transportation Equipment (37) 79.0 23.6(39.0) 80.7
Precision Instruments (38) 14.0 0.0 12.3
Misc. Manufacturing (39) 5.2 10.7 3.0
Source:
Hamilton, Zeile and Kim (1991), Table 5, p.116.
Notes:
a. The figures in parentheses include the sales of state-owned businesses,
computed from the Yearbook of Financial Statistics of the Republic of China,
and the Report on 1983 Industrial and Commercial Census of the Republic of
China.
b. The Taiwanese business group share is principally in Pulp and Paper.
Includes Chemical Products.
ci. Includes Beverage and Tobacco.
. The Korean chaebol share is principally in Wood Products and Furniture.
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Table 3 Hypothesis tests for 5-digit SIC: Taiwan versus Korea
Industry (SIC) Variety Index Product Mjx Index
1978—82 1983—88 1978—82 1983-88
T>K K>T U T>K K>T U T>K K>T U T>K K>T U
Int.rm.diat. Products
Textile Mill Products (22)
Lumber & Wood Products (24)
Pulp & Paper Products (26)
Chemical Products (28)
Stone, Clay & Glass (32)
PrimaryMetal(33)
Fabricated Metal (34)
2 0 4 5 3 3
2 0 0 2 0 1
0 0 2 1 0 3
0 0 2 2 0 3
3 1 3 6 0 4
1 1 3 2 3 2
8 0 3 9 1 7
2 2 2 3 3
2 0 0 1 0 2
1 3. 0 1 1 2
1 0 1 2 0 3
2 2 3 4 3 3
4 1 0 1 4 2
6 1 4 7 3 7
Subtotal 16 2 17 27 7 23 18 7 10 19 14 24
Final Products
Food Products (20)
Apparel & Textile Prod. (23)
Furniture (25)
Printing & Publishing (27)
Rubber & Plastic Prods.(30)
Leather Products (31)
Industrial Machinery (35)
Electrical Equipment (36)
Transportation Equip. (37)
Precision Instruients (38)
Misc. Manufacturing (39)
4 1 1 6 1 0
8 0 8 9 1 13
—--- 0 0 1
2 0 2 1 0 3
1 0 2 2 1 7
3 1 4 4 0 5
1 0 3 5 1 5
4 1 9 11 1 12
1 0 0 1 0 1
2 0 4 3 0 3
4 0 9 5 1 9
2 1 3 2 3 2
4 9 3 4 13
-——- 0 1 0
1 3 0 1 3 0
2 1 0 2 7 1
2 3 3 2 3 4
0 2 2 3 5 3
3 8 3 7 10 7
0 1 0 0 2 0
1 3 2 1 4 1
2 6 5 6 6 3
Subtotal 30 3 42 47 6 59 17 37 21 28 57 27
Total
Industries by Test
Number of industries
Percentage
46 5 59 74 13 82
110 169
42% 5% 54% 44% 8% 49%
35 44 31 47 71 51
110 169
32% 40% 28% 28% 42% 30%
j: T>K (K>T) means the hypothesis that the Taiwan index is less (greater)
than the Korean index at the 5-digit level was rejected at the 10% level;
U means that both these hypotheses could not be rejected.
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Table_3A Hypothesis tests for 2-digit SIC: Taiwan versus Korea
Industry (SIC) Number of
Consnon Goods
Variety Index Product Mix
Index
1980 1985 78—82 83-88 78-82 83-88
Int.rmsdiats Products
Textile Mill Products (22)
Lumber & Wood Products (24)
Pulp & Paper Products (26)
Chemical Products (28)
Stone, Clay & Glass Prod. 32)
Primary Metal (33)
Fabricated Metal (34)
44 157
14 18
7 16
9 39
51 72
35 74
151 222
U(T( U
T T
U U
U U(T)
T T
U K
T T
U(K) U
T T
T U(T)
U(T) T
U U
T K
T T
Subtotal 311 598 T--3 T--3
K--0 K--i
U--4 U--3
T--4 T--3
K--0 K--i
U--3 U--3
Final Products
Food Products (20)
Apparel & Textile Prods. (23)
Furniture (25)
Printing & Publishing (27)
Rubber & Plastic Prods. (30)
Leather Products (31)
Industrial Machinery (35)
Electrical Equipment (36)
Transportation Equipment (37)
Precision Instruments (38)
Misc. Manufacturing (39)
58 67
376 1170
-- 15
19 25
29 76
93 159
17 62
191 236
10 22
71 68
94 132
T T
T T
-- U
T U(T)
U(T) U(T)
T T
U(T) T
U(T) T
T T
U(T) T
T T
U(T) U
U U
-- K
K K
U U
K U
K U(K)
U U
K K
U K
K U
Subtotal 958 2032 T--6 T--8
K--0 K--0
U--4 U--3
T--0 T--0
K--S K--4
U--S U--i
Total 1269 2630 T-—i0 T--l2
K--0 K--0
U--i U--6
T-—4 T-—3
K--S K--S
U--b U--b
Ng: T (K) means the hypothesis that the Taiwan index is less (greater) than the
Korean index for all S-digit industries within each 2-digit group was
rejected at the 10% level; U means that these two hypotheses were both
accepted or both rejected; U(T) and U(K) are borderline cases.
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Table 4 Hypothesis tests for 5-digit SIC: Taiwan versus Japan
Industry (SIC) Variety Index Product Mix Index
1978-82 1983—88 1978-82 1983-88
T>J J>T U T>J J>T U T>J J>T U T>J J>T U
Int.rm.diats Products
Textile Mill Products (22)
Lumber & Wood Products (24)
pulp & Paper Products (26
Chemical Products (28)
Stone, Clay & Glass (32)
PrimaryMetal(33)
Fabricated Metal (34)
0 8 7 1 10
2 0 1 3 0 0
0 1 3 0 1 6
C 6 0 2 15 2
0 5 6 1 6 S
0 4 2 0 10 3
0 7 6 2 5 13
6 6 3 4
-
—
2 1 0 1
0 1 3 1 2 4
3 1 2 1
3 5 3 5 5 2
3 2 1 4 7 2
6 3 4 9 6 5
Subtotal 2 31 25 9 47 36 23 19 16 30 38 24
Final products
Food Products (20)
Apparel & Textile Prod. (23)
Furniture (25)
Printing & Publishing (29)
Rubber & Plastic Prods.(30)
Leather Products (31)
Industrial Machinery (35)
Electrical Equipment (36)
Transportation Equip. (37)
Precision Instruments (38)
Misc. Manufacturing (39)
Subtotal
1 1 6 6 2 1
4 4 8 5 5 15
--—- 0 0 1
0 2 2 0 1 3
0 2 4 0 1 9
3 0 3 6 0 2
1 7 6 0 13 11
0 9 11 0 13 12
1 1 1 0 0 3
0 5 2 0 4 3
0 7 9 0 3 13
3 4 1 4 S 0
5 6 5 8 7 10
---- 0 1 0
1 2 1 2 1 1
4 1 1 4 5 1
3 2 1 3 3 2
3 8 3 4 15 5
3 14 3 4 17 4
2 1 0 2 1 0
0 5 2 0 5 2
5 7 4 7 8 1
10 38 52 17 42 73 29 50 21 38 68 26
Total
Industries by Test
!4umber of Industries
Percentage
12 69 77 26 89 109
158 224
8% 44% 49% 12% 40% 49%
52 69 37 68 106 50
158 224
33% 44% 23% 30% 47% 22%
j: T>K (K>T) means the hypothesis that the Taiwan index is less (greater)
than the Korean index at the 5-digit level was rejected at the 10% level;
U means that both these hypotheses could not be rejected.
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Table 4A Hypothesis tests for 2-digit SIC: Taiwan versus Japan
Induitry (SIC) Number of
Common Goods
Variety Index Product Mix
Index
1980 1985 78—82 83—88 78-82 83-88
Int.rm.diat• Products
Textile Mill Products (22)
Lumber & Wood Products (24)
Pulp & Paper Products (26)
Chemical Products (28)
Stone, Clay & Glass Prod.(32)
Primary Metal (33)
Fabricated Metal (34)
127 248
25 22
11 40
51 195
93 115
45 126
217 289
J
T T
U(J) U(J
J J
3 j
3 j
J J
u
U
3 j
U(Tj U
u
u u
U T
Subtotal 575 1035 T--1 T--1
J--5 3--S
U--i U--i
T--O T--l
3--i 3--i
U--6 U--S
Final product.
Food Products (20)
Apparel & Textile Prods. (23)
Furniture (25)
Printing & Publishing (27)
Rubber & Plastic Prods. (30)
Leather Products (31)
Industrial Machinery (35)
Electrical Equipment (36)
Transportation Equipment (37)
Precision Instruments (38)
Misc. Manufacturing (39)
95 98
407 1256
-- 16
25 27
61 86
71 120
89 193
257 297
26 35
106 126
139 164
U U(T)
U U
-- U
3 U(J)
3 U(J)
T T
3 3
3 3
U U
3 3
3 3
U U
U U
-- 3
U(J) U(J)
T U
U U
U U
U(J) U
U U(T)
3 J
U U
Subtotal 1276 2418 T--i T--i
3--6 J--4
'J--3 U--6
T--1 T--0
3--i J--2
U--8 U--9
Total 1851 3453 T--2 T--23--li J--9
U-—4 U--7
T--l T--l
J--2 3--3
U--14 U--14
T (K) means the hypothesis that the Taiwan index is less (greater) than the
Korean index for all 5-digit industries within each 2-digit group was
rejected at the 10% level; U means that these two hypotheses were both
accepted or both rejected; U(T) and U(K) are borderline cases.
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Table 5 HypothesIs tests for 5-digit SIC: Korea versus Japan
Industry (SIC) Variety Index Product Mix Index
1978—82 1983-88 1978-82 1983-88
K>J J>Y. TJ K>J J>K U K>J J>K U >j j>y '
Int.rin.diat. Products
Texti1 Mill Products (22)
Lumber & Wood Products (24)
Pulp & Paper Products (26)
Chemical Products (28)
Stone, Clay & Glass (32)
PrimaryMetal(33)
Fabricated Metal (34)
0 9 0 0 10 2
0 2 0 0 1 1
0 0 2 0 2 3
0 5 0 0 8 1
0 4 4 0 8 2
0 8 1 0 11 2
0 10 2 0 12 6
2 2 5 2 5
0 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 2 2
0 1 4 2 5 2
2 5 1 1 6 3
2 4 3 3 7 3
1 6 5 4 8 6Subtotal 0 38 9 0 52 17 8 20 19 13 34 22
Final products
Food Products (20)
Apparel & Textile Prod. (23)
Furniture (25)
Printing & Publishing (27)
Rubber & Plastic Prods.(30)
Leather Products (31)
Industrial Machinery (35)
Electrical Equipment (36)
Transportation Equip. (37)
Precision Instruments (38)
Misc. Manufacturing (39)
0 4 4 0 3 7
2 8 5 3 7 13
-—-- 0 1 0
0 2 2 0 2 2
0 2 2 0 S 4
1 0 5 3 0 5
0 4 2 0 11 3
0 10 6 0 15 9
0 1 0 0 1 1
0 4 2 0 6 1
0 6 6 1 4 9
3 1 4 5 0 5
3 6 6 9 7 7
---- 1 0 0
2 2 0 2 1 1
2 2 0 3 3 3
4 2 0 S 2 1
3 1 2 5 3 6
3 8 5 5 12
1 0 0 1 0 1
2 3 1 2 2 3
6 2 4 6 5 3
Subtotal 3 41 34 7 55 54 29 27 22 44 35 37
Total
Industries by Test
Number of Industries
Percentage
3 79 43 7 107 71
125 185
2% 63% 34% 4% 58% 38%
37 47 41 57 69 59
125 185
30% 38% 33% 31% 37% 32%
jg: T>K (K>T) means the hypothesis that the Taiwan index is less (greater)
than the Korean index at the S-digit level was relected at the 10% level;
U means that both these hypotheses could not be rejected.
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1eA Hypothesis tests for 2-digit SIC: Korea versus Japan
Industry (SIC) Number of
Common Goods
Variety Index Product Mix
Index
1980 1985 78-82 83-88 78-82 33-38
Int.r.diat• Products
Textile Mill Products (22)
Lumber & wood Products (24)
Pulp & Paper Ptoducts 26
Chemical Products (28>
Stone. Clay & Glass Prod.32)
Prrnary Metal (33)
Fabricated Metal (34)
76 226
12 11
20
33 90
32 l6
16) 229
.3 .3
.3 tJ(J)
U .3
.3 J
J J
.3 .3
.3 .3
.3 -
.3 .3
U)J)
UJ
n
.3 .3
Subtotal 337 818 K--0 K--0J--6 J--6
U--i U--i
K--0 --0
.J--3 .3- -
U--4 .Y--2
Final products
Food Products (20)
Apparel & Textile Prod. (23>
Furniture (25)
Printing & Publishing >27)
Rubber & Plastic Products (30)
Leather Products (31)
Industrial Machinery (35)
Electrical Equipment (36)
Transportation Equipment (37)
Precision Instruments (38)
Misc. Manufacturing (39)
77 95
333 1114
-- 15
20 25
32 73
60 116
28 81
208 247
10 24
82 80
102 127
J .3
.3 .3
--
.3
.3 .3
.3 .3
U K
.3 .3
.3 .3
.3 .3
.3 J
.3 J
K K
U U
-- K
U U
U U
U(K) K
K U
U U
K K
U U
U U
Subtotal 952 1997 K--0 K--iJ--9 J--10
U--i U--0
K--3 K--4
J--0 J--0
U--7 U--7
Total 1389 2815 K--0 K--i
.3—-iS .J--16
U--2 U--i
K--3 K--4
J--3 j--5
U--li U--9
T (K) means the hypothesis that the Taiwan index is less (greater) than the
Korean index for all 5-digit industries within each 2-digit group was
rejected at the 10% level; U means that these two hypotheses were both
accepted or both rejected; U(T) and t)K) are borderline cases.
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